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Poorer households crowd richer communities and free ride by consuming relatively little housing thereby
avoiding taxes.
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The analogy between competition among firms in providing private goods and Tiebout (1956) 
competition among jurisdictions in providing local public goods is central to the economic study 
of local public finance.  The basic idea is that household mobility will induce jurisdictions to 
provide efficient mixes of local public goods and taxes, or they will fail to attract residents.  
While we confirm that decentralized provision with head taxes is potentially efficient, this paper 
focuses on departures from efficiency in the realistic case of property taxation.  Given property 
taxation, we ask whether decentralized multi-community provision increases welfare at all 
relative to centralized provision.  Thus, we compare multi-community equilibrium to the 
centralized alternative with one community, a single property tax rate, and uniform local public 
good provision.  While the environment is one where potential welfare gains from efficient 
Tiebout provision are present, we show quantitatively in a realistically calibrated model that the 
multi-community property-tax equilibrium not only fails to achieve potential welfare gains, but 
either leads to small average welfare losses or wipes out the potential gains.  The multi-
community equilibrium entails three inefficiencies: standard housing consumption distortions 
from property taxation; voting distortion in the choice of property taxes; and a jurisdictional 
choice externality, where relatively poorer households free ride on richer households in suburbs 
by buying small houses to avoid taxes.  We can as well quantify the several inefficiencies, and 
we identify the jurisdictional choice externality as the inefficiency that prevents realization of 
potential Tiebout sorting gains.   
  The focus of the paper is on gauging the extent of departures from efficiency in Tiebout 
equilibrium.  A rich theoretical model is needed to seriously quantify efficiency effects of 
Tiebout provision.  We build on the model developed in Epple and Platt (1998), assuming 
mobile households differing by income and a taste parameter and assuming continuous variation 
in housing consumption.  Household utility depends on numeraire consumption, housing 
consumption, and the level of the local congested public good (e.g., per student educational 
expenditure).  The economy, which we think of as a metropolitan area (MA), is characterized by 
an aggregate housing supply function that can be derived from a neoclassical housing production 
function with the MA’s given land area and other elastically supplied factors as inputs.  The 
baseline “centralized equilibrium” to which we do comparisons assumes the MA is one 
jurisdiction, where households first buy housing and then vote for a single property tax, the   2
proceeds financing uniform provision of the local public good.  We compare this baseline 
equilibrium to allocations where the MA is divided geographically into an exogenous number of 
communities, each with given land area and thus housing supply having positive elasticity.  
Using the centralized equilibrium as the baseline permits us to quantify welfare gains from 
efficient decentralized provision to which we compare welfare gains/losses of equilibrium 
decentralized provision with property taxation. 
  Purely theoretical analysis permits insights into the normative properties of the 
allocations we study, but quantification, including resolution of trade offs, requires the 
development of a computational counterpart model.  We first examine an efficient Tiebout 
allocation for the given number of communities.  We show theoretically that planner-determined 
head taxes used to finance community levels of the local public good would implement an 
efficient Tiebout allocation with mobile households.  This generalizes Oates’s (1972) celebrated 
decentralization theorem to the present model and, especially, to allowing mobility.  We find an 
efficient Tiebout allocation in our computational version of the model, and compute the 
compensating variation gains relative to the centralized property-tax equilibrium.  These gains 
are substantial, equal to 2.67% of mean household income in our preferred calibration.  This 
computation then determines the potential gains from Tiebout sorting.   
  We then turn to the multi-community property-tax equilibrium.  Here households first 
purchase housing in a community/jurisdiction.  They then choose their jurisdiction property tax 
rate by majority vote, the proceeds of which are used to provide the jurisdiction’s public good.  
Our findings regard cases when an income-stratified equilibrium exists, i.e., when a Tiebout-type 
equilibrium arises.
1  Such equilibria arise for realistic parameter values when standard single-
crossing restrictions on preferences are imposed.
2  While the Tiebout-type equilibrium permits 
households with heterogeneous incomes and preferences to sort into communities and consume 
differing levels of the local public good, the three inefficiencies noted above prevent realization 
of all potential gains of Tiebout provision relative to the centralized equilibrium.  Computing the 
compensating variation, we find average welfare losses!    
  By computing allocations that remove one or more of the inefficiencies in the multi-
community property tax equilibrium, we can delineate the relative effects of the three 
                                                 
1 These equilibria are also stratified by the preference parameter for the local public good. 
2 The model will generally have a non-stratified equilibrium with communities that are clones as well, and 
multiplicities of stratified equilibria are possible.  We then select the equilibrium that is most realistic, as detailed 
below.      3
inefficiencies.  We find that the jurisdictional choice externality underlies the failure to realize 
efficiency gains.  Relatively poorer households crowd richer jurisdictions to consume more of 
the local public good and free ride by consuming little housing thereby avoiding property taxes.  
To demonstrate that this crowding is the key inefficiency, we compute the allocation where 
households are assigned to communities as in the efficient (head-tax) Tiebout allocation, but then 
vote for property taxes, this allocation removing the jurisdictional choice externality but 
retaining the other two inefficiencies.  Here 80% of the potential welfare gains from efficient 
Tiebout provision arise.  The finding that it is free riding by relatively poorer households that 
explains the lack of welfare gains is counterintuitive (at least to us) because one might think that 
free riding would be most inefficient in the baseline centralized equilibrium where everyone 
lives in the same jurisdiction.  However, when relatively richer communities arise that have high 
expenditures on local public goods in the Tiebout equilibrium, the efficiency costs of free riding 
rise.    
  We examine robustness of our findings by varying parameters in the computational 
model.  Our finding of losses or negligible welfare gains in the property-tax Tiebout model is 
fairly robust, though parameter variations that curtail free riding lead to welfare gains.  For 
example, sufficiently inelastic housing supplies in jurisdictions imply the price of housing 
services rises precipitously as households crowd the suburbs, increasing the cost of “free” riding 
on richer households’ high property tax payments.  Most interesting is that increasing the number 
of jurisdictions by more subdivision of the MA does not reverse the welfare losses we find in our 
preferred calibration, at least up to 100 jurisdictions, which covers the empirically relevant range.  
The logic is that, as long as free riding is feasible, the key inefficiency persists; and the 
efficiency costs of free riding need not decline with the number of communities for the same 
reason losses arise as soon as one goes from one to multiple communities.    
  A vast literature on Tiebout-type equilibria exists. The theoretical inefficiencies that we 
identify are known.
3  On the purely theoretical side, our contributions are to characterize the 
efficient Tiebout allocation in the Epple-Platt model and to provide a characterization of the 
                                                 
3 The idea that the “poor chasing the rich” can be associated with a departure from efficiency in Tiebout economies 
is well known.  Theoretical contributions framing the efficiency issues include Wildasin (1980), Boadway (1982), 
Brueckner (1983), Gordon (1983), Wilson (1997), and papers discussed in the text. Fernandez and Rogerson (1996) 
show policies that induce wealthier households to move into the poorest jurisdiction can be Pareto improving.   
Benabou (1996) nicely delineates equity and efficiency effects theoretically in Tiebout economies.  Surveys of the 
literature are provided by Epple and Nechyba (2004), Ross and Yinger (1999), Rubinfeld (1987), and Scotchmer 
(2002). 
   4
jurisdictional choice externality that arises in property tax equilibrium in this setting.  Our main 
contribution is, however, quantification of inefficiency effects in this rich and fairly realistic 
setting, while showing extreme efficiency costs of the jurisdictional choice externality for 
realistic parameter values.     
  Very few papers have pursued the quantification of Tiebout efficiency effects.  Bradford 
and Oates (1974) provide a very influential estimate of welfare gains from decentralization. They 
focus on education as the key service provided by local governments, and they compare 
decentralized to centralized provision. Assuming efficient decentralized provision, they estimate 
a welfare loss from centralization equal to 50% of the population-weighted sum of the absolute 
changes in expenditures that arises from equalization of expenditures under centralization.  Their 
model is much simpler than ours, but the most important difference from our main analysis is 
their assumption of efficient Tiebout provision.
4  Fernandez and Rogerson (1998) investigate the 
differences in human capital accumulation between a decentralized and a centralized economy in 
a model without taste differences.  They find that centralization is beneficial from the perspective 
of human capital accumulation in a steady state. Using their household utility function and 
calibration of it, we find the static welfare difference between the centralized and decentralized 
allocations to be approximately zero.
5  Thus, we confirm our finding of gross inefficiencies in 
decentralized equilibrium using an independently specified model.  More recently, Brueckner 
(2004) compares Tiebout equilibrium with taxation of mobile capital to the centralized 
alternative and shows by simulation that welfare can be higher or lower in the Tiebout 
equilibrium.  Brueckner’s focus is on the trade off from inefficient tax competition for mobile 
capital, the focus of the tax competition literature, and the gains from matching levels of public 
goods to diverse preferences.  Our research differs in several important ways.  The tax we 
investigate is on (immobile) housing, so the fundamental inefficiency in Brueckner’s analysis is 
not present here.  Brueckner’s Tiebout sorting is efficient in that a community forms for every 
                                                 
4 In an appendix on robustness of our findings 
(http://public.tepper.cum.edu/facultydirectory/FacultyDirectoryProfile.aspx?id=54), we relate our analysis to 
Bradford and Oates in more detail.  There we perform in our model the welfare calculation that is analogous to that 
done by Bradford and Oates, and obtain a welfare gain from decentralization that is remarkably close to theirs.  This 
finding highlights that the differing conclusions that we obtain in this paper about the welfare effect of 
decentralization are not due to differences with respect to the potential gains from decentralization. Rather, we find 
that the inefficiencies associated with the current institutional structure, which relies on property taxation, dissipate 
those potential gains. 
5 In our appendix on robustness (see the previous footnote) more detail on the Fernandez and Rogerson (1998) 
model is provided along with our related calculations.     5
preference type, while we treat community boundaries as given with an infinite number 
(continuum) of different types and households then select their preferred community.
6 
As the largest single local government expenditure, education has been a particular focus 
of analysis of provision regimes, with contributions by Benabou (1993, 1996), deBartolome 
(1990), Epple and Romano (2003), Fernandez and Rogerson (1996), Ferreyra (2007), and 
Nechyba (1999, 2000). None of these papers undertakes the welfare comparisons we do here. 
  Section 2 presents the theoretical model and associated positive and normative properties.  
The quantitative analysis is presented in Section 3.  We calibrate a computational model and 
show that welfare losses from Tiebout provision are a real possibility.  Here we identify the main 
source of inefficiency, an externality in choice of jurisdiction in which to reside.  Section 4 
concludes, including a bit more discussion of the related literature.       
2. Theoretical Analysis. 
a. Elements of the Model. Our intent is to examine the allocative efficiency of multi-
jurisdictional or Tiebout provision of a congested local public good in a metropolitan area under 
property taxation.  We examine the efficiency of Tiebout provision relative to the alternative of 
single-jurisdictional provision, where in the latter the metropolitan area is a single jurisdiction 
with all residents facing the same property tax rate and level of provision of the public good.
7  
We will also study efficient provision regimes that vary with respect to feasible policies (e.g., tax 
instruments), providing other benchmarks to which we compare the Tiebout equilibrium.  The 
model is an archetypical model of a metropolitan area with property taxation, originally 
presented in Epple and Platt (1998).  We now describe the model, followed by discussion of its 
virtues for the task at hand.   
  Households have a utility function over numeraire consumption x, housing consumption 
h, and the level of the local public good g measured in dollars.  Households differ by endowed 
income y and a taste parameter α, with the latter measuring taste for the local public good as 
clarified below.  The joint distribution on household type (y,α) is continuous and given by 
F(y,α), with joint density function f(y,α) assumed positive on its support 
2 S[ α,α]x[y,y] R .     
                                                 
6 Another, mainly empirical, literature examines the consequences of centralization versus decentralization for 
growth.  See Brueckner (2006) for a theoretical analysis and for references.   For analysis of welfare effects in 
community models with local income taxation, see Goodspeed (1995) and Schmidheiny (2006).   
7 The single jurisdiction regime is commonly referred to as “centralized provision” in the literature on education 
finance, so we also employ this terminology.     6
Let U = U(x,h,g; α) denote the household utility function, strictly quasi-concave, increasing, and 
twice continuously differentiable in (x,h,g).  Further restrictions on U are discussed below.  
  Under Tiebout provision, the metropolitan area (MA) is divided into J jurisdictions, each 
with non-decreasing housing supply function 
jj
ss H( p) , where 
j
s p  denotes the net-of-tax or 
supplier price of housing, and j = 1,2,…,J henceforth unless indicated otherwise.  We assume 
absentee housing owners who supply housing competitively, but we account for their rents in our 
welfare calculations.
8  We assume absentee housing owners because it is most standard and 
simplest.   
Equilibrium is determined in three stages.  First, households purchase a home in a 
jurisdiction.  Second, they vote in their jurisdiction for a property tax that is used to finance the 
local public good.  Last, the local public good is determined from local governmental budget 
balance, and households consume (although their housing consumption is determined in the first 
stage).  The local public good is “fully congested,” meaning per household consumption equals 
total taxes divided by the number of households.  Households have rational expectations, thus 
anticipate all continuation equilibrium values.
9   
  In the comparison centralized equilibrium, the MA constitutes one jurisdiction with 
housing supply that is the usual aggregation of the J housing supplies in the Tiebout case.  Here 
households first purchase housing in the MA, and then vote for an MA-wide property tax taking 
housing consumption as given.  Last, a uniform level of the local public good is determined by 
the MA balance budget condition and households consume. 
  While the model is fairly simple, it is tractable and leads to a rich set of predictions about 
household sorting, housing prices, tax rates, and provision levels in Tiebout equilibrium.  The 
model’s tractability also permits clarification of the efficiency issues that arise in the Tiebout 
setting, as well as their quantification.  The model has also been estimated and shown to fit well 
the data (Epple and Sieg, 1999; Calabrese, Epple, Romer and Sieg, 2006).   
  Before beginning the formal development, some key assumptions and abstractions of the 
model warrant explanation. The best application is to the provision of public education.  The 
                                                 
8 One interpretation is that the MA is divided into jurisdictions with fixed amounts of land, and land is combined 
with elastically supplied factors to produce units of housing.  Then the “absentee housing owners” could just as well 
be absentee land owners.  In Section 3, we provide a specific example of this.  
9 This specification conforms to the case sometimes called “myopic voting,” because households take as given 
residences, housing consumption, and the supplier price of housing when voting, which are all established in the 
first stage.  We examine this case because it is historically the most studied case in the literature.  We show in an 
appendix on robustness (see footnote 5) that the welfare loss we find from Tiebout sorting increases with other 
standard specifications of the timing of choices and thus voter beliefs that may be more appealing.     7
congestion assumption is the standard one in the analysis of the provision of public education, 
while clearly some economies in provision of education arise in reality.  We wish, however, to 
abstract from making assumptions about these economies, while also examining the efficiency of 
Tiebout provision in a setting where it has the most potential to produce efficiency gains.  We 
show efficiency losses (frequently) arise under Tiebout provision relative to the centralized 
equilibrium, losses that would be greater if there were economies of scale.
10  We also assume no 
commuting costs as in the standard Tiebout modeling.
11  Again, the existence of commuting 
costs would favor centralized provision simply because separate jurisdictional provision only has 
the potential to constrain efficient household location.  Our model also abstracts from potential 
productivity gains under multi-jurisdictional provision induced by residents being attracted to 
lower-cost providers or from other competitive mechanisms, which would argue for multiple 
jurisdictions.  But our intent is to focus strictly on allocative efficiency simply because this is of 
interest in its own right.  Moreover, the centralization that we examine need not rule out separate 
localities that receive the same per household allocation and then provide the local public good.   
Productivity gains could then be realized in both equilibrium regimes we study.  Thus, the 
possibility of productivity gains from multiple local providers is an independent issue from the 
question of allocative efficiency. 
b. Positive Properties of Equilibrium.  The results in this subsection draw together and unify, 
with some minor generalizations, results from the literature.  We need to describe the model and 
positive properties of the equilibria we study before the normative development in Section 2c, 
which is new.  Preferences are assumed to satisfy some single-crossing restrictions concerning 
how preferences for the public good vary with income and household type, which underlie 
household sorting across jurisdictions in Tiebout equilibrium.  We describe determination of 
equilibrium and relate two propositions that collect key elements of it.   
  To provide a formal description of equilibrium in the Tiebout case, begin with the third 
stage.  Let fj(y,α) denote the density of household types living in jurisdiction j, tj the property tax 
rate, and hj(y,α) housing consumption of household (y,α), all of which are given in the third 
                                                 
10 If the publicly provided good is a pure public good that can be consumed by everyone in the MA, then obviously 
an efficient allocation has one (quality) level of provision consumed by all residents  To engender the efficient 
quality would require non-distortionary taxation efficiently determined.  One can consider a variety of cases 
between purely public and fully congested publicly provided goods.  For example, parks are reasonably assumed to 
be congested, but not perfectly so.  Multiple parks that are geographically dispersed in a MA might be efficient.  As 
in this paper, one might compare decentralized multi-jurisdictional provision to centralized provision, with multiple 
tax and park quality levels in the former case versus a single tax level with uniform park qualities in the latter case.     
11 See deBartolome and Ross (2003,2004) for analysis that integrates commuting costs into a Tiebout model.   8
stage.  The gross housing price j (p ),local public good level (gj), and household numeraire 
consumption are determined in the third stage, satisfying respectively: 
    
j
jj s p( 1 t ) p ,                                                                                 (1) 
        
jj j
jj j s s s S gf ( y , ) d y d t p H ( p ) ,                                                                  (2) 
and 
                                           
j
js j xy ( 1 t ) p h ( y , α),                                                                     (3) 
where 
j
s p  is also given, established in the first stage.
12  Obviously, the third stage values exist 
and are unique for any vector of predetermined variables. 
  Now consider the second, voting, stage.  Substitute (1) into (3), and then (3) into the 
utility function and write indirect utility of household (y,α) as a function of  jj (p ,g ): 
   jj j j j j V(p ,g ;y, ) U(y p h (y, ),h (y, ),g ; ).                                                        (4) 
When voting on the property tax rate, households maximize V(·) while correctly anticipating that 
jj (p ,g ) will satisfy (1)-(2), taking as given 
j
jjs (f (y,α),h (y,α),p ).
13  Suppress the j indicator and 
compute the slope of an indifference curve of V = constant in the (g,p) plane: 
   
gg y
p Vc o n s t .
VU / U dp
;
dg V h(y,α) 
                                                                       (5) 
where the arguments in the numerator of the right-hand side of (5) are the same as in the right-
hand side of (4).   We make the following “single-crossing assumptions” with respect to 
indifference curves in the (g,p) plane. 
 






                                                                         (SRI) 
and 






                                                                        (SRα) 
                                                 
12 Because households will correctly anticipate all equilibrium values, a negative numeraire will never arise in 
equilibrium. 
13Since the supplier price of housing is established in the first stage and the model is one period, voters do not take 
account of capital gains or losses on their homes when voting.  See Epple and Romer (1991) for a method of 
instilling such gains/losses in such a model.  They show that incentives to increase redistributive taxes are curtailed 
if these effects are taken into account.     9
Assumption SRI, “slope rising in income,” means that the willingness to trade an increase in 
housing price for higher g rises with income.  Intuitively, from the right-hand side of (5), one can 
see that this corresponds to cases where the marginal value of g rises faster with income than 
does housing demand.
 14  The intended nature of the taste parameter is embodied in Assumption 
SRα.  For given income, higher-α households are also more willing to trade an increase in 
housing price for increased g.   
  Proposition 1 summarizes key properties of the voting stage, with properties illustrated in 
the panels of Figure 1. 
Proposition 1:  Assume that V(pj,gj;y,α) is twice continuously differentiable and strictly quasi-
concave in (pj,gj) for (pj,gj) > 0 .  Assume also the Inada condition that  0   g Va s g .    
Then: 
a. Majority voting equilibrium exists and is unique. 
b. The equilibrium is the preferred choice of households (y,α) on the downward sloping locus 
m
j y( α)satisfying: 
     5  
m
j y( α ) α
jj
α y
f(y , α)dydα .N;                                                          (6) 




Nf ( y , α)dydα.                                                                 (7) 
c. Households living in community j with (y,α) to the “northeast” (“southwest”) of the 
m
j y( α)locus in the (α,y) plane prefer a higher- (lower-) than equilibrium tax.  
 
Parts (b) and (c) of Proposition 1 are from Epple and Platt (1998). Part (a) shows that the 
necessary conditions for voting equilibrium presented in Epple and Platt (1998) are sufficient for 
existence and uniqueness of voting equilibrium.  A proof of Proposition 1 is available on request 
from the authors.  Figure 1A depicts in household type space the locus of median preference 
voters in jurisdiction j, 
m
j y( α). The 
ji
b y()  loci in Figure 1A partition the (α,y) plane into 
jurisdictions and are discussed below.  Figure 1B depicts the optimum of a median preference 
voter, which occurs at a tangency of an indifference curve (V = const.) and the community 
budget constraint (2), with (1) used to substitute out tj. 
                                                 
14Epple and Sieg (1999) and Calabrese, Epple, Romer, and Sieg (2006) provide evidence supporting this 
assumption.      10
  An example that satisfies the conditions for Proposition 1 is the CES utility function: 
ρρ ρ 1/ρ
xhg U[ β x β h β (α)g ] ,    with ρ < 0 and βg’(α) > 0.  We employ this utility function in our 
computational analysis in Section 3. 
  Now consider the first-stage household choices and the implications for the full (three-
stage) equilibrium.  Households choose jurisdictions and housing consumption in this stage.  
Since households correctly anticipate all equilibrium values, their housing consumption satisfies 
ordinary demand, which we denote by hd.  Thus a household that chooses to live in jurisdiction j 
consumes housing: 
    djj hh ( p , g , y , α) for all j and (y,α).                                                       (8) 
Given jurisdictional choices, housing market clearance in community j determines the supplier 
price of housing: 
   
jj
djj j ss Sh( p, g, y , α)f (y,α)dydα H( p) ;                                                        (9) 
where pj satisfies (1) for correctly anticipated tj.  
To determine choice of jurisdiction, find indirect utility 
   jj j djj djj j V(p ,g ;y, ) U(y ph (p ,g ,y, ),h (p ,g ,y, ),g ; ).                                   (10)  
Households choose among the J jurisdictions to maximizeV,   correctly anticipating equilibrium 
(pj,gj), j = 1,2,…,J.  We use a ‘  ’ to indicate the indirect utility function relevant in the first stage, 
which allows housing to vary optimally with (p,g,y,α).  Using that hd maximizes U(·), the slope 




VU / U dp
;




                                                                                (11) 
but evaluated at the same argument values as is utility on the right-hand side of (10).   We make 
the analogous single-crossing assumptions on V   as SRI and SRα, which we reference as 
  SRI and SRα.  The two pairs of single-crossing assumptions are closely related, and, for 
example, both pairs hold in the CES example of the utility function above if ρ < 0.  
Summarizing, an equilibrium arises if the following conditions are satisfied:  In each 
community j, (pj,gj) satisfy (1) and (2).  Household numeraire consumption satisfies (3).  The tax 
rate in each community is the majority choice, where households maximize V(·) when voting.  
Housing consumption satisfies ordinary demand, (8), and the supplier price of housing in each 
community satisfies housing-market clearance (9).  Residential choices maximize V().       11
There are two types of equilibria that can arise.  Our interest is in Tiebout-type equilibria 
with differences among jurisdictions in levels of provision of the public good and with at least 
some households having a strict preference for their choice of jurisdiction.  Thus, assume for 
now that  ij g g , for all jurisdictions i j.    Proposition 2 summarizes key characteristics of such 
equilibria: 
Proposition 2: Tiebout equilibria with jurisdictions numbered such that g1 < g2 < …< gJ: 
a. Have ascending bundles:  12 ... .   J p pp  
b. Are stratified by income and the taste parameter: For given α, if a household with income yi 
resides in a higher-numbered jurisdiction than a household with income yj, then yi ≥  yj with 
equality for at most one income level.  For given y, if a household with taste parameter αi resides 
in a higher-numbered jurisdiction than a household with taste parameter αj, then αi ≥  αj with 
equality for at most one value of α. 
c. Exhibit boundary indifference and strict preference for non-boundary households: Households 
that exist with income level  ( ), 1,2,..., 1,  
ji
b yi j J   for whom:  
  
  jj i i kk k 1,2,...,J V(p ,g ;y,α)V ( p , g ; y , α)M a x V ( p , g ; y , α)                                     (12) 
form a boundary in the (α,y) plane that partitions residents between communities j and i (see 
Figure 1A).  Households on a boundary are indifferent between their chosen residents while all 
other residents strictly prefer their residential choice.  
 
  Versions of these results are in the literature (see, e.g., Epple and Platt (1998)), and we 
just outline the logic here.  Proposition 2a must hold to have anyone choose a lower numbered 
community.  Proposition 2b follows from the single-crossing assumptions   SRI and SRα.  
Proposition 2c follows from continuity of utility in its arguments.  Typically, a boundary will be 
between communities j and j+1, but we cannot rule out that, for some α, no types will choose a 
community (implying, e.g., a boundary might be between j and j+2 for some α).  Note that 
Proposition 2b implies that boundaries will be downward sloping. 
Existence of Tiebout equilibrium in the three-stage model is not guaranteed, but is not 
unusual.
15   We provide computed examples below.   Multiplicity of Tiebout equilibria can arise 
if housing supplies differ across jurisdictions.  In the case of two jurisdictions having different 
                                                 
15 Restrictions on preferences and technology sufficient for existence in the analogous model with no taste variation 
are developed in Epple, Filimon, and Romer (1984, 1993).   12
housing supplies, then either might be the lower-g and poorer jurisdiction.  With J jurisdictions 
each with different housing supply, then J! Tiebout equilibria can arise, where any jurisdiction 
would be the poorest, any of the remaining the second poorest, and so on.  A non-stratified 
equilibrium always exists in the model as well.  Suppose, for example, that each jurisdiction has 
the same housing supply.  Suppose, further, that households choose jurisdictions in the first stage 
such that fj = f/J for all y.  Then the continuation equilibrium values are the same in each 
jurisdiction; the jurisdictions are clones.  In turn, the initial residential choices are equilibrium 
ones since the households are indifferent to their community.  These non-Tiebout equilibria do 
not require the same housing supplies; initial residence choices can be adjusted so that the same 
(p,g) values arise in each jurisdiction.  There are also mixed equilibria generally where proper 
subsets of jurisdictions are clones, these acting like one jurisdiction in a fully stratified 
equilibrium.  Such equilibria are unstable when a Tiebout sorting equilibrium exists (see, e.g., 
Fernandez and Rogerson, 1996).  We study here fully stratified Tiebout equilibrium (i.e., with g 
different in every jurisdiction), obviously in cases where such an equilibrium exists. 
  The comparison centralized equilibrium assumes the metropolitan area is one 
jurisdiction, with housing supply that is the usual aggregation of the jurisdictional housing 
supplies in the Tiebout case.  Equilibrium is determined analogously to the above, but with no 
alternative jurisdictions to choose from in the first stage and with one vote of the entire 
population over the tax rate, followed by consumption and provision of the public good.   From 
above, it follows that a centralized equilibrium exists and is unique.  Obviously, no matching of 
varied preferences to public goods arises in the centralized case.  Our interest is in the welfare 
comparison of the centralized equilibrium to the Tiebout equilibrium, when the latter exists.
16   
c. Efficiency Considerations.  In this sub-section, we examine efficiency issues theoretically.  
We focus initially on the social welfare problem and characterize efficient allocations.  Solving 
this problem is of interest for several reasons.  First, the characterization of efficiency is of 
intrinsic interest.  Second, the solution permits us to compute efficient allocations and then 
quantify the potential efficiency gains from multi-jurisdictional provision relative to the single-
jurisdictional equilibrium. When we compute an efficiency loss from equilibrium Tiebout 
provision, it is of interest to compare the loss to the feasible gains from household sorting.  We 
will see that an efficient allocation can be implemented using head taxes while not using 
                                                 
16 Note that the centralized equilibrium values correspond to those in the decentralized non-stratified (clone) 
equilibrium discussed in the previous paragraph, so one can interpret the comparison this way as well.   13
property taxes.  The third virtue of examining the social welfare problem is that we can easily 
modify the analysis to examine a constrained social welfare problem where only property taxes 
are permitted.  The solution of this social welfare problem serves to identify the key inefficiency 
that arises in the Tiebout property tax equilibrium.   
(i)  The Planner’s Problem.  We first solve the planner’s problem and characterize Pareto 
efficient allocations.  Let ω(y,α) > 0 denote the weight on household (y,α)’s utility in the social 
welfare function and ωR > 0 the same for the absentee housing suppliers.
17  Let r(y,α) denote the 
planner’s monetary transfer to household (y,α) and R the total transfer to the housing suppliers.  
The social planner is permitted to levy in community j both a head tax Tj and a property tax (tj), 
the former necessary to obtain efficiency as we show.  It is again convenient to work with an 
indirect utility function.  Let: 
 
e
jj j j j j h V( p, g, y r ( y , α)T , α)M a x U ( y r ( y , α)T p h , h , g ; α),                                  (13) 
where the solution to the maximization problem in (13) is given by hd(pj,y+r(y,α)-Tj,gj,α), 
recalling that hd(·) denotes ordinary housing demand.  Finally, let  j a( y , α)[ 0 , 1 ]   denote the 
proportion of households (y,α) assigned by the planner to community j. 
  Pareto efficient allocations solve the social planner’s problem: 
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The social planner chooses balanced-budget transfers ((15)), taxes and balanced-budget levels 
for the local public goods ((17)), and assigns households to communities ((18)) so as to 
maximize the social welfare function.  We also write the problem requiring competitive housing 
provision ((13) and (16)).  Requiring competitive provision of housing and local budget balance 
may seem to impose some second-best requirements on the “efficient” allocation.  However, as 
                                                 
17 We assume housing suppliers have quasi-linear utility functions and the social planner treats them all the same.   14
discussed below, these impositions are consistent with first-best Pareto efficiency.
 18  A solution 
to the problem is Pareto Efficient for any social welfare weights (ω(y,α),ωR).  If a Pareto 
improvement were feasible relative to any solution, then the objective function would increase 
with the change, a contradiction.  As the social weights are varied, alternative Pareto efficient 
allocations are determined.  The latter follows since as one moves along the Paretian frontier, the 
gradient changes, which serve as social welfare weights corresponding to the particular Pareto 
efficient allocation.  If the utility possibilities set is convex, then all Pareto efficient allocations 
are a solution to the problem for some set of weights.
19  Note, too, that r(y,α) = R = 0 will arise in 
the solution to the planner’s problem for some weights (ω(y,α),ωR), this no-transfer case being 
most naturally compared to the market equilibrium allocation. 
  To solve the problem, write the Lagrangian function: 
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where λi, ηi, and Ω are multipliers, we have suppressed arguments of functions, Vi
e is notation 
indicating that V
e has arguments corresponding to community i, and constraint (18) is taken 
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where 
i
1 U  is the partial derivative of U with respect to its first argument and the superscript 
indicates evaluation of the function at community i values.  (We continue to use such notation 




ia f i i i i i d MSV(y, ) L V [T g ] h                                                                         (21) 
denote the marginal social value of assigning a measure aif(y,α) of household type (y,α) to 
community i, which equals the first variation in the Lagrangian with respect to type (y,α).
20   
Now taking account of (18), the optimal household assignment criterion can be written
21: 
                                                 
18 We treat the housing supplies to jurisdictions as a technological constraint.  That is, we do not allow jurisdictional 
lines to be redrawn, which would effectively permit trading of housing between jurisdictions.   Depending on one’s 
perspective, the solution might then be regarded as second best.  In Section 3, we will also compute the efficient 
allocation that allows each household to occupy their own jurisdiction.   
19 If the constrained utilities possibilities set is not convex, then one can still find all Pareto Efficient allocations as 
extrema of the planner’s problem.  Some solutions would be local minima of the problem but would satisfy the same 
(first-order) conditions we derive below.   See Panzar and Willig (1976).   
20 This is scaled by f(y,α) just to be comparable across types.     15
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  We restrict attention to cases where it is efficient to have differentiated communities as in 
Tiebout allocations.  By differentiated communities, we mean allocations having assignments 
with ai(y,α) = 1 for some community i for almost every household (see (21) and (22)).  
Alternative allocations have households of the same type live in multiple communities as when 
communities have the same set of types.  Whether differentiation is optimal depends on the 
utility weights in the social welfare function.  Essentially, we want to compare equilibrium 
allocations with differentiation to efficient allocations that entail differentiation. 
  First we confirm what is very intuitive:  The social optimum will have no property 
taxation, just head taxes.  More to our purposes, unilateral household choice of residence with an 
efficiently chosen head tax would be consistent with the efficient allocation.  We will then go on 
to examine the second-best problem assuming only property taxes are allowed, which helps to 
clarify the inefficiencies in the Tiebout property-tax equilibrium.   
                                                                                                                                                             
21 If the middle line of (22) characterizes the solution for a household y, then the summation constraint in (18) comes 
into play.  However, we will focus on cases where this does not characterize the optimum, as discussed below.   16
Proposition 3:  In an efficient differentiated allocation: (a)  ii ii t0 a n d T g ;    (b) gi satisfies 
the community Samuelsonian condition; and (c) households are assigned to the community 
where Vi
e is at a maximum. 
Proof of Proposition 3:  (a) First we show that  ii t0 .    From (20) and that the allocation is 
differentiated:  
       
ii
1id R U( h / y )     for all households (y,α) assigned to community i.                          (28) 
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Then (29) and (25) imply: 
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Since ωR > 0, if ti = 0, then ηi = 0 and the reverse.  Now we show that   i t 0 implies a 
contradiction.   Multiply through (28) by 
i
di h a f and integrate to obtain: 
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where we have substituted the housing market clearance condition ((16)).  Now substitute from 
(30), (31), and (32) into (27) to get: 
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The term in parentheses in the integrand in (33) is the slope of the compensated demand for 
housing and is then negative.  Hence, the integral term is negative, implying ηi = 0.  This 
contradicts (31), so it must be that ti = ηi = 0. 
 Since  ti = 0, Ti = gi by local budget balance (i.e., (17)).     17
(b) Using ηi = 0, substitute from (25) into (26).  Then use that 
i
1 U   equals a constant from (28) 
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(c) Using the results in part (a), (21) and (22) imply that a household is optimally assigned to the 
community where Vi
e is maximized.                                                                                                 ■ 
 
  It is straightforward to confirm that the same results obtain if the planner also assigns 
housing consumption to each household and if the government budget constraint is economy-
wide, rather than local.  Regarding the former, households would, of course, be assigned the 
level of housing demanded.  Regarding the latter, direct income transfers permit the government 
to accomplish the same set of utility levels as would also allowing transfers across jurisdictions.  
The reason we have specified the problem imposing competitive housing consumption and 
jurisdictional budget balance is because we want to impose these requirements in the second-best 
analysis that follows, and then we can easily use the preceding equations.   
  A key implication of Proposition 3 is that if head taxes are set in communities to provide 
the local public goods optimally, then household choice of communities would be socially 
optimal.  Unilateral choice of community would lead households to choose the community where 
e
i V is at a maximum, which, by Proposition 3c, is efficient.  Likewise, competitive provision of 
housing is efficient.  The non-distorted price of housing and the head tax efficiently price access 
to communities.  No externalities in community choice arise in this case.
22   
  Proposition 3 can be viewed as a generalization of the celebrated decentralization 
theorem of Oates (1972).  Our framework follows Oates in assuming no spillovers from the local 
public goods, costs of provision the same for the centralized as for the decentralized case, and 
uniform provision under centralization.
23  Our result extends Oates’s theorem by permitting 
                                                 
22 If housing supplies differ across communities, then there are generally multiple local maxima of the social 
planner’s problem.  Consider the two-community example, and suppose community 1 has larger housing supply 
than community 2. The efficient allocation might have either community the relatively more wealthy community; 
suppose community 2 is richer at the global maximum.  Then there exists a local maximum of the social welfare 
function where community 1 is richer, and the corresponding (second-best) optimal head taxes would induce 
unilateral community and housing choices consistent with this local maximum.  An appendix, available from the 
authors on request, provides more detail on this issue.  We return to this issue in Section 3, when it becomes relevant 
to computations.   
23 See Oates (1999, 2006) for a detailed discussion of the assumptions underlying the theorem.   18
households to be mobile and by establishing that optimally chosen head taxes can achieve the 
efficient decentralized allocation when households are mobile. 
  Now we examine the planner’s problem assuming head taxation is not allowed.  The 
planner’s optimum with property taxation identifies an externality in community choice that we 
will show computationally to underlie the efficiency loss we find in Tiebout equilibrium in 
realistic calibrations.  Set Ti = 0 everywhere above and drop the first-order condition describing 
the efficient choice of Ti, i.e., (25).  With Ti = 0, the other first-order conditions remain valid.
24  
Of course, ti will be positive here and is optimally chosen by the planner, but we will also discuss 
later the alternative where ti is suboptimal.  From (21), setting Ti = 0, now 
ei
ii i i i d MSV(y, ) V g h .       Expression (22) continues to describe optimal assignments 
using the latter value of MSVi.  Household choice of a jurisdiction, rather than jurisdictional 
assignment by the planner, would now be associated with an externality, and its character is the 
focus.  The value of what we call the “jurisdictional choice externality (JCE)” of household (y,α) 
in jurisdiction i is given by: 
  ii i i d i i J C E ( y ,) g h ( p , yr ( y ,) , g ,) .                                                                     (35) 
From the expression for MSVi, we see that JCEi(y,α) equals the social value of assignment to 
community i of household (y,α) in excess of the household’s own (socially weighted) utility. 
Thus JCEi(y,α) measures the social benefit or cost imposed on others when household (y,α) 
locates in jurisdiction i.  To simplify the analysis, we now assume that housing demand is 
independent of gi, as arises in the specification we analyze numerically below.
25 
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which equals household (y,α)’s tax payment in jurisdiction i.  Let hc(·) denote a household’s 


















                                                                                 (37) 
Observe that  i [0,1]  , where the integral term in the denominator of θi is the elasticity of the 
compensated demand.  We have: 
                                                 
24 We continue to study cases with differentiated communities at the solution to the planner’s problem. 
25 We will also indicate what changes if housing demand does depend on gi.   19
Proposition 4:  (a) The jurisdictional choice externality in the planner’s solution satisfies: 









Uaf d y d
0,
N
                                                                                                (39) 
(where 
i
3 U  is the derivative of utility with respect to gi).
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(c) JCEi(y,α) is negative for all households in community i with housing demand below the mean. 



















                                                                         (40) 
Substituting (36), (37), and (40) into (35), yields (38).  Expression (39) follows from (26) using 
our assumption that housing demand is independent of gi, and the value of λi is obviously 
positive.
26 
(b) These results follow trivially from (38) and the definition of θi (i.e., (37)). 
(c) This follows from (38) since   i [0,1]   and gi equals the tax payment of the household in 
community i with average housing consumption.                                                          ■ 
 
  The main implication is that an equilibrium allocation with property taxation, where 
households choose communities, will have too many households selecting jurisdictions with high 
g’s, especially poorer households (assuming housing demand is normal).  Intuition suggests, and 
(38) confirms, that the JCE will be proportional to the difference between the value of the service 
the household consumes (g) and the tax paid by that household.
 The “tax paid” by a household 
equals the tax “shifted forward,” .  In the limit with perfectly elastic housing supply (θ = 1), a 
household’s consumption of housing corresponds to new production, and taxes are effectively 
collected from the household in proportion to housing consumption.  In this case and assuming 
an income elasticity of housing demand equal to one, households with income above (below) the 
community average and thus housing consumption above (below) the average exert a positive 
                                                 
26 If housing demand depends on gi, then a sufficient condition for λi to be positive is that housing demand is non-
increasing in gi.  The remaining results in Proposition 4 are as stated.   20
(negative) externality.   At the opposite extreme with housing supply elasticity equal to 0 (and 
thus θ=0), every household’s consumption of housing displaces that of other households in the 
community, and taxes to cover consumption of g are fully absorbed by the absentee housing 
owners.   Here every household exerts a negative externality proportional to g in the 
community.
27   
  In contrast to the case with efficient head taxes, note from (40) that the multiplier (η) on 
the housing-market clearance condition is positive except when the housing supply elasticity is 0.  
This is because the gross housing price inefficiently deters housing consumption and is not 
enough to deter poor households from moving into high-g communities.  Requiring housing 
consumption in excess of demand could then improve efficiency.
28  If the tax ti is inefficient (i.e., 
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Now ηi can be positive or negative.  This is because gi might be over-provided (conditional on 
using property taxation) and then limiting housing consumption would reduce this distortion. 
  The efficiency analysis reveals three inefficiencies that will arise in a Tiebout property 
tax equilibrium.  The fact that the constraint on the housing market clearance condition is 
generally binding under property taxation ( 0  ), implies that this taxation is inefficient.  
Property taxation distorts housing market consumption in the usual way with competitive 
housing markets   Second, the property tax rate and thus g in each jurisdiction will not be chosen 
                                                 
27 In light of the preceding, it is tempting to conclude that the aggregate loss from the JCE is highest when the 
elasticity of housing supply is zero.  However, the aggregate loss associated with the JCE depends not only on the 
externality created by a household’s location choice, but also on the number of households who make location 
choices that depart from the efficient allocation. That number will tend to be smaller when the housing supply 
elasticity is low than when it is high, for the following reason. Consider two communities, one of which is poor, the 
other wealthy. As households move from the poor to the wealthy community, the housing price in the wealthy 
community rises more rapidly when the housing supply elasticity is low. Similarly, the price in the poor community 
falls more rapidly when the supply elasticity is low. These price effects limit the extent to which location choices 
depart from the optimum. Hence, when the housing price elasticity is low (high), the externality from a poor 
household that chooses the wealthy community is high (low), but the number of households whose location deviates 
from the optimum is low (high).  The net effect of a change in the housing price elasticity is then ambiguous. We 
find computationally that welfare rises as the housing supply elasticity falls for low and intermediate elasticity 
values (see Section 3).   
28 See Calabrese, Epple, and Romano (2007) on residential zoning that improves efficiency. 
29 This is found by solving the planner’s problem with ti exogenous, hence suppressing condition (24).  We continue 
to assume that Ti must be 0.   21
by a planner in equilibrium, rather will be the majority choice.
30  Third, having property taxation 
rather than (efficient) head taxation will imply a jurisdictional choice externality as we have 
seen.
31  We have highlighted this externality in the analysis because it is less obvious and 
because we will show that it is the major cause of the welfare losses we find in Tiebout 
equilibrium. 
3. Computational Analysis  
We specify and calibrate a computational model that illustrates the tendency for decentralization 
to be inefficient.  The computational model also permits us to delineate the magnitudes of the 
three sources of inefficiency.  We describe the baseline model, clarify our measurement of 
efficiency, present the main findings, and examine robustness.   
a. Specification and Calibration of the Model.   Household utility is assumed to be CES: 
 
1/
xhg U[x h g ],
                                                                                                   (42) 
with the taste parameter α equated to βg. We must calibrate the metropolitan area (MA) income 
distribution, the distribution of the taste parameter, the number of jurisdictions, and the 
parameters of the utility function and housing supply functions.  
We assume constant elasticity housing supply function in each jurisdiction.  Such a 
housing supply function arises if units of housing are produced competitively by combining a 
jurisdiction’s inelastically supplied land Lj with an elastically supplied factor q according to 
constant-returns production function: h = L
γq
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                                                                                              (43) 
where w is the given price of input q.  The quantity of housing available at given housing price 
then varies across jurisdictions proportionately to their land endowment. In our baseline 
calibration, we assume five local jurisdictions in the MA – a large city and four smaller suburbs 
that have equal area.  The total land supply in the MA is normalized to 1.  The city is assumed to 
                                                 
30 See Bergstrom (1979) for analysis of majority choice and efficiency. 
31 The above-discussed multiplicity of Tiebout equilibria when jurisdictions have different housing supplies implies 
another type of inefficiency can arise.  These equilibria differ with respect to the stratum and size of the population 
that occupies each community.  Efficiency generally entails grouping households with similar demands for local 
public goods in the same community.   With variation in the “size” of communities it is also relatively efficient to 
match community sizes to sizes of groups with similar demands for the local public good .  One of the Tiebout 
equilibria will do a better job of accomplishing this size matching.  Thus, the other Tiebout equilibria then suffer 
from the additional inefficiency of “poor size matching.”  We will study the Tiebout equilibrium that is most 
empirically relevant in our computational analysis, placing the poorest stratum in the largest jurisdiction, which we 
interpret as the central city.   22
have 40% of the total land area and each of the suburbs 15%.  We assume that the city is the 
poorest jurisdiction (see footnote 31).  The jurisdictions are numbered from poorest to richest: 
Hence, L1 = .4, and L2 = L3 = L4 = L5 = .15, where Lj equals community j’s land share.  The 
parameter γ equals the share of land inputs in housing in our model.  Based on the empirical 
evidence (see the discussion in Epple and Romer, 1991), we set γ = ¼.  Note from (43) that this 
implies a housing supply elasticity equal to 3.
32  Parameters in the baseline calibration are 
reported in Table 1. 
  The distribution of MA income is calibrated using data from the 1999 American Housing 
Survey (AHS).
33  Median income reported by the AHS is $36,942.  Using data for the 14 income 
classes reported by the AHS, we estimate mean household income to be $54,710.  These values 
and our assumption that the income distribution is lognormal imply lny ~ N(10.52,.785). 
  We assume that βg = α follows a lognormal distribution.  We calibrate its variance so that 
the across jurisdictional income variation in the baseline Tiebout equilibrium we compute equals 
25% of the MA variance in income.
34  Using annual data for the Boston metropolitan area, Epple 
and Sieg (1999) found that the across-jurisdiction share of the variance of income was on the 
order of 15%. Annual incomes are a noisy measure of permanent income, however, leading to an 
overstatement of within-jurisdiction income variance as shown by Davidoff (2005).  He 
estimates the across jurisdiction share to be 28% in the Boston MA.  Hence, we have opted for a 
value closer to Davidoff’s estimate, specifically 25%. The implied standard deviation of βg is 
approximately given by: SD [βg] = .000932.  Note that this implies substantial income mixing 
within jurisdictions. 
  The remaining parameter values are  xh g ρ,β ,β ,and E[β ] from the utility function (42), 
and w from the housing supply function (43).   The remaining calibration is based on the single 
jurisdictional equilibrium for simplicity.  First, we set βx = 1, a normalization.  While less 
obvious, w is also a “free parameter,” which we also then set equal to 1.  To see this, note from 
                                                 
32 This housing supply elasticity is within the range of estimates for new housing, though estimates vary 
substantially.  See Dipasquale (1999), Blackley (1999), and Somerville (1999).  Dipasquale and Wheaton (1992) 
estimate the long run rental housing supply elasticity to be 6.8.  Other estimates also find a higher elasticity than 3 
(see Mayer and Sommerville, 2000, and Epple, Gordon, and Sieg, 2010).   
33 http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/ahs/99dtchrt/tab2-12.html 
34 A standard decomposition of the variance of income yields:  
J
jj j j1 VAR[y] VAR[y ] VAR[y ];
    where yj 
denotes income in jurisdiction j,  j y  its mean, and  j φ is the proportion of residents in jurisdiction j.  Thus we 
calibrate so that  j VAR[y ]/VAR[y] .25.     23
(43) that the housing supply function for the MA is:    
1 11
ss Hwp 1 ,
  
     and this is 
the only place that w appears in the model.  For any γ, changing w is equivalent to changing the 
units of measurement of housing.  No equilibrium values relevant to utilities then vary with w. 
  The values of E[βg], βh, and ρ are set so that in the single jurisdictional equilibrium the 
median voter chooses t = .35, the net-of-tax expenditure share on housing equals .20, and the 
price elasticity of housing is very close to -1.  A t = .35 implies a tax rate on property value that 
is realistic, on the order of 2.5% to 3.0%.
35  The expenditure share on housing of .20 is in the 
range of values estimated in the literature (see Hanushek and Quigley (1980)).  Likewise, the 
housing market literature indicates a price elasticity close to -1.
36  The implied values of E[βg] 
and βh are, respectively, 0.094 and .356.  We set ρ = -.01, which implies a price elasticity of 
housing demand equal to -.993, while also implying SRI and existence of a Tiebout equilibrium 
when there are multiple jurisdictions.
37   
b. Measuring Welfare.  We treat the centralized property-tax equilibrium as the status quo 
and use (the negative of) aggregate compensating variation in moving to the Tiebout property tax 
equilibrium as our welfare measure.  Let U
c(y,α) denote utility of household (y,α) in the 
centralized equilibrium and U
T(y,α) utility in Tiebout equilibrium.  Let v(y,α) denote 
compensating variation, defined in U
c(y,α) = U
T(y+v,α).  Let 
S CV v(y, )f(y, )dyd      denote 
aggregate household compensating variation.  Let 
c
s p J cj
s j1 0 RH ( p ) d p
    denote housing rents in 
the centralized equilibrium, where 
c
s p  denotes the net housing price.  Let  
j
s p J Tj
s j1 0 RH ( p ) d p
    
denote housing rents in the Tiebout equilibrium.  Compensating variation of the absentee 
landlords is given by: R
c – R
T.  We report W
T = - [CV + R
c – R
T] as our welfare measure, while 
also typically reporting the components, aggregate consumer welfare (-CV) and housing rents 
(R
T-R
c).  The negative of compensating variation is reported, so a positive value indicates a gain 
                                                 
35 Observed property tax rates are typically expressed as a percent of property value. In our model, rates are 
expressed as a percentage of annual implicit rent. Employing the approach of Poterba (1992), Calabrese and Epple 
(2006) conclude that tax rates on annualized implicit rents can be converted to rates on property values using a 
conversion rate on the order of 7% to 9%. Thus, our annualized rate of .35 translates to a tax rate on property value 
on the order of 2.5% to 3%, which is the order of magnitude of observed property tax rates. 
36 See Rosen (1979), Hoyt and Rosenthal (1990), and Rosenthal, Duca, and Gabriel (1991).  Hanushek and Quigley 
(1980) obtain somewhat more inelastic estimates. 
37 A ρ = 0 implies a Cobb-Douglas utility function and a price elasticity of demand for housing exactly equal to -1.  
In this case,  SRI fails and an equilibrium with Tiebout sorting does not arise.     24
from Tiebout sorting.  We measure the welfare effect of going from the centralized equilibrium 
to the efficient allocation the same way.   
c. Findings.  Table 2 summarizes the welfare effects in the baseline calibration, comparing the 
Tiebout property-tax equilibrium and efficient allocation to the centralized property-tax 
equilibrium.  The proportion of the population that is worse off relative to the centralized 
equilibrium and the welfare changes, averaged over resident households and for housing 
absentee owners are reported.  The first column shows the welfare effects of going from the 
centralized property tax equilibrium to the Tiebout property tax equilibrium.  We see that 63% of 
the resident population is worse off in the Tiebout allocation, with a per capita welfare loss equal 
to $51.20.  The middle rows parcel the loss between the housing suppliers (“Change in Rents”) 
and MA residents.   Note that ‘-CV’ equals the per capita (negative) compensating variation 
since the population is normalized to 1.  While the welfare loss is small (.09% of mean income), 
a potential welfare gain from instead moving to an efficient allocation equals $1,459 (2.67% of 
mean income), as reported in the second column.  This column provides the same welfare 
measures, but values for moving from the centralized property tax equilibrium to an efficient 
allocation.  This “efficient allocation” is the local maximum of the social welfare problem 
assuming no transfers and with the poorest stratum of the population living in the large 
community.
38   
  Before we dissect the welfare effects in the baseline case, consider Figure 2.  Figure 2 
shows the per capita welfare effect of moving to the Tiebout property tax equilibrium as a 
function of the number of jurisdictions, for three values of the housing supply elasticity.  We 
vary the number of jurisdictions by subdividing the suburbs, always keeping each suburb with 
the same, but smaller, land area, and maintain the land area in the city equal to 40%.  For the 
moment, examine the middle (solid) curve with εs = 3, the baseline value.   It is perhaps 
surprising that the welfare loss we find in the baseline calibration is not due to our restriction to 4 
                                                 
38 To be comparable to the decentralized property tax equilibrium, we have computed welfare effects in Column 2 
of Table 2 for the efficient allocation conditional on the poorest segment choosing the largest community.  As 
discussed in footnote 22, when housing supplies differ, there can be multiple “efficient” head-tax allocations that 
vary with respect to which income segments are assigned to the variably sized communities.  More formally, these 
“efficient allocations” are local maxima of the social welfare problem.  We have also computed the most efficient 
allocation that could possibly result which, given the no congestion assumption, is equivalent to treating g as a 
private good, produced in a competitive market with constant cost.  This would be like the efficient head tax 
allocation if every household lived in their own community.  The average welfare gain from this allocation relative 
to the centralized Tiebout equilibrium equals $1682. Because we find a gain of $1459 from the 5-community 
efficient allocation (Column 2 of Table 2), 86.7% of the latter value, we can infer that our restriction to 5 
communities and focus on this local maximum of the social welfare problem does not bias our analysis.        25
suburbs, and in fact the per capital welfare loss rises slightly as the number of jurisdictions 
increases.  To understand this finding and all our computational results, we return for now to the 
baseline calibration with 5 jurisdictions, and examine the welfare effects in more detail.  
  Table 3 reports positive and normative properties of five allocations for the baseline 
parameters, with positive elements in the upper part of the table and normative elements in the 
lower part.  The second and third columns are exactly the same allocations reported respectively 
in the first and second columns of Table 2, but now including detail on positive properties of 
these allocations.  Understanding positive properties of the allocations is crucial to understanding 
the welfare effects as well as being interesting in their own right.  The first column of Table 3 
reports the positive properties of the benchmark single jurisdiction property tax equilibrium.  
Ignore the last two columns of Table 3 for the moment.      
  Positive properties of the allocations reported in Table 3 are the gross housing prices, 
proportions of community residents, property-tax rates (when applicable), and per household 
local public good expenditures.  The reported normative properties are exactly as in Table 2.  
The first column reports positive values for the single-jurisdiction equilibrium.  It has a gross 
price of housing services equal to $17.13, a property tax rate on those services of 35%, and 
uniform provision of g of $3,830, these values driven by the calibration as discussed above.  The 
second column reports values for the Tiebout property-tax equilibrium.  It is income- and taste-
stratified and supported by ascending housing prices, although the property tax rates vary little 
and are very close to that rate in the centralized equilibrium.  Because these tax rates apply to 
substantially different housing expenditures, the public good levels vary substantially.  The 
equilibrium population proportions (the Ni’s) closely match the land allocations to the 
jurisdictions.  We have already seen there is a per capita welfare loss relative to the single-
jurisdiction equilibrium of about $51. 
  With respect to positive economic variables, what is most notable about the efficient 
allocation (third column), as compared to the property-tax Tiebout allocation, is that the efficient 
allocation is much more stratified: In the efficient allocation, the central city has 70% of the 
population, while the most elite suburb has only 3% of the population, these in spite of the same 
land allocation and thus housing supplies as in the Tiebout property-tax equilibrium.  Along the 
same lines, the g’s rise much more rapidly as one moves up the hierarchy in the efficient 
allocation.  Recall that these are financed by community head taxes in the efficient allocation so 
there are no property taxes to report.  The reason that housing prices rise along the hierarchy in   26
the property tax equilibrium, but not so in the efficient allocation, is that housing prices are bid 
up as poorer types move into richer jurisdictions in the property-tax equilibrium, while head 
taxes limit this behavior in the efficient allocation.
39 
To delineate the sources of the welfare losses that arise in Tiebout property-tax 
equilibrium, we calculate two other allocations.  Recall, three inefficiencies arise in Tiebout 
equilibrium:  First, property taxation distorts housing consumption with the usual deadweight 
loss.  Second, majority choice of the tax rate conforms to the choice of the median-preference 
households in a jurisdiction, which generally differs from the choice that would maximize 
average welfare.  Third, externalities arise in household choice of jurisdiction. 
The second, majority voting inefficiency, is generally believed to be small in these 
models.  To verify this here, we compute multi-jurisdictional equilibrium with majority choice of 
a head tax.  Equilibrium is determined precisely as in the multi-jurisdictional property-tax model, 
but voting is over a local head tax that fully finances the local public good.  Versions of 
Propositions 1 and 2 apply to this variation of the Tiebout sorting model.
40  Values for this 
equilibrium are shown in Column 4 of Table 3.  The head taxes are, of course, equal to the levels 
of public good provision.
41  Comparing Column 4 to Column 3, one sees that the allocation is 
very close to the efficient allocation.  The per capita welfare gain of $1,447 relative to the single-
jurisdictional equilibrium is 99.2% of the potential welfare gain from household sorting.  Thus, 
we conclude that voting bias is a minor effect and does not explain why the property-tax 
equilibrium fails to induce welfare gains.   
  The welfare loss in the Tiebout equilibrium is then largely attributable to property 
taxation and the jurisdictional choice externality rather than voting bias.  To delineate these 
effects, we assign households to jurisdictions as arises in the efficient allocation, but then let 
them vote for a local property tax to finance the public good.  Hence, this allocation essentially 
removes externalities from household choice of jurisdiction, while retaining the two other 
distortions—the property tax distortion and the voting bias.  This is not an equilibrium allocation 
because some households would prefer to move.  The associated values are reported in Column 5 
                                                 
39 Recall that the efficient allocation is derived by assigning households to communities, but the assignments are 
consistent with individually optimal community choice (Proposition 3c).   
40 The ascending bundles property trivially regards the head tax, not the housing price.  Since the head tax is a 
deterrent to moving into a jurisdiction,  housing prices can decline across jurisdictions as the level of the public good 
ascends as we find between jurisdictions 2 and 3 in column 4 of Table 3.   
41 Because the calibration of income begins at 0, some households in the poorest jurisdiction cannot afford to pay the 
$1765 head tax.  The proportion of the population is negligible, so we simply ignore this.      27
of Table 3.  This allocation generates an average welfare gain of $1,183 relative to the single 
jurisdiction property tax equilibrium, or 81% of the potential $1,459 potential gain.  
We conclude that the jurisdictional choice externality is the main cause of the welfare 
loss we find.  Relatively poor households crowd into richer jurisdictions to consume high levels 
of the public good, while free riding on richer households that pay more in taxes and on the 
absentee land owners that absorb tax payments.  This free riding is evidenced by the markedly 
higher percentages of households that live in the suburbs in the Tiebout property tax equilibrium 
(see Column 2 of Table 3) than in the efficient allocation (see Column 3 of Table 3).  To see this 
free riding more clearly, Figure 3 compares the partition of household types in the efficient 
allocation and in the decentralized property-tax equilibrium.  Those above the upper most dashed 
curve reside in the highest-g community (i.e., that numbered 5) in the efficient allocation; those 
between the latter curve and the next upper most dashed curve comprise the residents of the 
second highest-g community 4 (i.e., that numbered 4); etc.  The solid curves likewise delineate 
the residents of the 5 communities in the Tiebout equilibrium.  We have measured income and 
the taste parameter in percentiles in Figure 3, so the area of a community residential space equals 
the community population.  For example, the area above the upper most dashed curve equals 3% 
of the total area (equal to N5 in Table 3 for the efficient allocation), while the area above the 
upper most solid curve equals 16% of the total area (equal to N5 in Table 3 for the multi-
jurisdiction property-tax equilibrium).  The comparative partitions in Figure 3 demonstrate that 
poorer households crowd the richer communities in the property-tax equilibrium relative to the 
efficient allocation.  The fundamental explanation for the welfare loss in Tiebout property tax 
equilibrium is that the resulting sorting of households is inefficient; it is not stratified enough.   
To illustrate the free riding in the property-tax Tiebout equilibrium yet another way, we 
order households within jurisdictions by their tax payments (or housing consumption) and 
compute the tax payments of the 10
th and 90
th percentile households, as well as the mean.   These 
tax payments are shown in Table 4 for the cases of the multiple jurisdiction property tax 
equilibrium (top 5 rows) and for the single jurisdiction property tax equilibrium (bottom row).  
Moving up the wealth hierarchy of jurisdictions in the former case, we see increasing differences 
between the mean and 10
th percentile payments, ($1304, $2013, $2519, $3295, $5396), 
indicating that free riding worsens as one moves up the jurisdictional hierarchy.
42  The bottom 
                                                 
42 One might alternatively compare the payment of the 10
th percentile payer to the 90
th percentile payment.  There 
are various ways to make this point.     28
row indicates substantial free riding as well in the single jurisdictional equilibrium, but of 
magnitude lower than results in the elite suburbs in the multiple jurisdictional case.   
The lack of Tiebout sorting gains in property tax equilibrium is counterintuitive even 
though we are in a second-best economy so that “anything can happen.”  Because the poor free-
ride on the rich in the centralized equilibrium as well, it would seem that some degree of sorting 
would lessen this externality.  But carving the MA into jurisdictions entails limiting within 
jurisdiction housing supplies, which intensifies the externality losses as the relatively poor crowd 
relatively rich jurisdictions.  Moreover, the free riding that takes place in richer jurisdictions is 
on higher levels of expenditure on the local public good.  Given property taxation, the analysis 
indicates that Tiebout sorting needs to be limited for realization of welfare gains.
43   
  It is interesting to examine further the distribution of welfare effects.  Table 5 reports 
welfare effects by household type for both the move to the efficient allocation (upper panel) and 
to the Tiebout property-tax equilibrium (lower panel), again with the single jurisdiction property-
tax equilibrium as the baseline.  Specifically, the table entries are the within cell average welfare 
change as a percentage of household income.  For example, the upper-left corner cell in the 
lower table with value .12 means that households with the lowest decile of both the taste 
parameter and income gain in welfare an average of .12% of their income in moving to the 
Tiebout property-tax equilibrium.  Consider first the upper panel.  We know from Table 2 that 
households gain on average $810 in going to the efficient allocation, though 74% are worse off.
44  
Rich households gain and poor households lose, regardless of their tastes for the public good.  
Rich households gain because they obtain a preferred level of the public good and because the 
free riding that arises in the single jurisdiction property-tax equilibrium is eliminated.  Poor 
households lose in spite of their more efficient consumption level of the public good  because 
they no longer can free ride.  Thus an equity-efficiency trade off arises in moving from 
decentralized provision with property taxes to an efficient Tiebout regime.  These welfare effects 
are very large for many. 
  From the lower panel of Table 5, we see that the average losses that result from 
decentralized property tax provision are not evenly distributed either, though the effects are 
                                                 
43 One might argue that the explanation points to a misallocation of housing to jurisdictions.  But this is essentially 
the same as saying that a misallocation of households to jurisdictions arises, which is the better perspective for given 
jurisdictional housing supplies.  More importantly, the problem does not go away by redrawing jurisdictional 
boundaries (see our robustness analysis).  Access to jurisdictions must be limited beyond that caused by housing 
prices.   
44 Welfare effects on housing suppliers are not included in Table 5.   29
generally small.  Low-income, low-taste types and high-income, high-taste types are better off.  
The former populate the lowest-g community in the decentralized equilibrium and gain due to 
the lower housing price, while not caring much about the reduced g.  The group of winners is 
smaller, about 10% of the MA population, and reside in the richest jurisdiction in Tiebout 
equilibrium.  In spite of paying higher housing prices, they gain because they value substantially 
the increased level of g.   
d. Robustness Analysis.    We examine robustness of our findings by varying key parameters of 
the model.  Consistent with our main finding of free riding as the central inefficiency in Tiebout 
equilibrium, the theme is that parameter variations that facilitate free riding increase welfare 
losses from decentralized provision under property taxes and the reverse if this activity becomes 
more costly.   
  Most interesting is the effect of increasing the number of jurisdictions.   We vary the 
number of jurisdictions by subdividing the suburbs, always keeping each suburb with the same, 
but smaller, land area, and maintain the land area in the city equal to 40 percent.   Figure 2 
graphs the per capita welfare change (including on housing suppliers) in going from one to 
multiple jurisdictions with property taxation, for three values of the housing supply elasticity.  
The solid curve is for the baseline elasticity.  As we increase the number of jurisdictions up to 
100, which subsumes the empirically relevant range, the welfare loss for the baseline elasticity 
varies by less than two dollars, the loss rising very slightly.
45  One might expect that smaller 
jurisdictions with smaller housing supplies would drastically curtail free riding and result in 
welfare gains.  While this might happen in the limit, it does not within the empirically relevant 
range.
46   The intuition is the same that explains why we get losses as soon as multiple 
jurisdictions come to exist.  Keep in mind that the free riding we have identified as the key 
                                                 
45 Adding jurisdictions beyond 100 is difficult computationally.  We have performed this exercise in a simpler 
version of the model, which is the same except with no taste variation (i.e., SD[βg] = 0).  Here we are able to 
increase the number of jurisdictions to 500.  We find the same welfare loss, which varies by less than $2 over the 
range of jurisdictions from 5 to 500.   
46 In an alternative model with a discrete number of households and where households have minimal housing needs 
(e.g., minimal land), once jurisdictions get small enough that they can only accommodate one household, then the 
free riding we study would become impossible.  Our model has a continuum of households and continuous housing 
consumption, so it is not clear what happens in the limit.  Note that having a discrete number of households is not 
enough to imply no free riding beyond some number of jurisdictions if housing consumption remains continuous.  
Even if there are as many jurisdictions as households so everyone could have their own jurisdiction, this does not 
imply poorer households would not want to move into a richer household’s jurisdiction if feasible.  An appendix 
available from the authors shows that free riding incentives can persist with a discrete number of households and 
equal number of jurisdictions. The implication of empty jurisdictions as households free ride in the latter case 
implies failure of existence of equilibrium  (because richer households would prefer to move to an empty 
jurisdiction rather than living with a poorer household, etc.).  Price taking of housing would become unrealistic, too; 
e.g., a rich household might easily buy up all land to prevent free riding.  These issues warrant more research.     30
inefficiency, where household escape taxes by consuming relatively little housing, arises in the 
single jurisdiction equilibrium.  While fewer households free ride within any jurisdiction as the 
number of jurisdictions increases, our analysis demonstrates that the overall welfare costs of this 
free riding does not decline with the number of jurisdictions.
47  So long as relatively poorer 
households can build homes in richer neighborhoods, the welfare costs we identify will be 
present (see the previous footnote).  
 Varying  γ, the land share parameter in the housing production function, corresponds to 
varying the housing supply elasticity.  We find that increasing the housing supply elasticity 
facilitates free riding and increases the welfare loss from decentralization, and the reverse for 
lowering it.  For example, relatively inelastic housing supply implies steep increases in housing 
prices as households crowd the suburbs, this deterring the free riding that is responsible for 
losses.  Figure 2 shows the welfare effect for a very low elasticity (εs = .1) and very high 
elasticity (εs =10) as a function of the number of jurisdictions.  In both cases, the welfare effect 
again remains relatively constant as the number of jurisdictions varies within this range.  For the 
high elasticity, the per capita loss rises substantially, varying between $1,059 and $1,177.  To get 
a sense of the extreme free riding that takes place here, we find that 59% of households live in 
the richest jurisdiction for the baseline value of 5 jurisdictions.   When the elasticity is very low, 
however, welfare gains result of about $400 per capita.   
  Table 6 summarizes the effects of the remaining parameter variations we present.  In each 
case, we vary a parameter from the baseline value while maintaining all other values.   The rows 
report the indicated effects relative to the corresponding centralized equilibrium.  The CES utility 
function implies the elasticity of substitution of goods equals 1/(1-ρ).  A positive value of ρ 
violates the single crossing assumptions and multi-jurisdictional equilibrium has clone 
communities with an allocation equivalent to the centralized case.  Hence, we consider further 
only negative values of ρ.  Since ρ = -.01 in the baseline, we just examine smaller values of it.  
As ρ and thus the elasticity of substitution decline, average welfare gains emerge and increase 
rapidly.  The intuition is that the mechanism whereby the poor free ride on the rich, which entails 
small housing purchases in richer jurisdictions, becomes less attractive when goods are more 
difficult to substitute.  Simply put, it is more painful for households to curtail their housing 
consumption.  Note, too, that the potential welfare gains from efficient Tiebout sorting rise 
                                                 
47 It is surprising as well that the welfare effects are essentially invariant to the number of jurisdictions.  Apparently, 
the welfare gains from better matching of public goods to preferences as the number of jurisdictions is increased are 
always offset by the free-riding effect over the range examined.    31
rapidly as ρ declines because matching of preferences to goods’ bundles has increased value 
when goods are more difficult to substitute.   
 Increasing  (decreasing)  βh relative to the baseline value of βh = .356 leads to smaller 
(larger) average welfare losses in Tiebout equilibrium.  The intuition is very similar to that 
explaining the consequences of varying ρ.  For example, a smaller value of βh implies housing is 
valued less, which facilitates the free riding mechanism and results in larger welfare losses. 
  Finally, we have independently varied the mean and standard deviation of the taste 
parameter distribution.  Increasing the mean leads to a higher welfare loss while also increasing 
the potential gain.  The reverse holds for a decrease.  Essentially, the effects that we have found 
in the baseline case are magnified as g becomes more important to households.  Changing the 
standard deviation of the taste parameter has small effects.
48     
4.  Concluding Remarks    In this paper, we have computed welfare effects of Tiebout sorting in 
a rich model with heterogeneity in household tastes and income, variable housing supplies, 
mobile households, and property taxation.  While the presence of inefficiencies in local property 
tax equilibria is understood, we believe this research provides the most realistic quantification of 
these effects to date.  We also provide a full theoretical characterization of the efficient 
allocation, which is of interest in its own right.  We compare the decentralized equilibrium under 
current institutional arrangements to an efficient allocation. We find the inefficiencies arising 
under the existing institutional structure to be substantial, dissipating potential average welfare 
gains that are substantial.  It is surprising to find that the welfare effects run counter to basic 
intuition concerning the gain from the Tiebout process.   
  The finding that decentralization as manifest in practice results in average welfare losses 
has led us to investigate the main source of the inefficiency.  We find that the externality in 
choice of residence is the primary source of loss.  Thus, ironically, the mobility that Tiebout 
emphasized as essential to the realization of potential efficiency gains of decentralization is also 
the culprit in preventing those gains from being realized under property taxation. 
  We have emphasized schooling as the primary local public good.  Efforts to reduce 
inequalities in the local public finance of schooling have lead to increased centralization in much 
of the U.S. (see, for example, Evans, Murray, and Schwab (1998)).  Few economists would 
                                                 
48 One can see in Table 6 that the proportion of losers changes substantially as we vary the standard deviation of βg, 
perhaps contradicting the statement in the text.  But the gains/losses are very small.  In the original version of this 
paper, we did extensive analysis of the case of no taste variation, and found analogous welfare effects.  Thus, it is 
not taste variation that drives our results.     32
challenge the notion that those inequalities, arising from Tiebout sorting, have adversely affected 
poorer households.  However, distributional issues aside, we, and we believe most other 
economists, had believed the Tiebout process to be efficiency enhancing.  Our findings suggest 
the implied concerns about efficiency losses from centralization may not be warranted.   
We realize that our analysis abstracts from potentially important elements.  Our 
perspective is that the efficiency analysis of empirical Tiebout equilibrium warrants more 
research.  We very briefly discuss a few issues that might be relevant.  In a very influential 
paper, Hamilton (1975) argued that zoning can overcome the inefficiencies associated with 
property taxation.  In Calabrese, Epple, and Romano (2007), we pursue a theoretical and 
quantitative analysis of equilibrium residential zoning that supports Hamilton’s argument that 
zoning can serve as a substitute for head taxation.  That analysis is, however, in the context of a 
model in which households differ only with respect to income. Whether such results carry over 
to an environment with preference heterogeneity is an important open question.  However, the 
empirical relevance of residential zoning is unclear.  Evidence on the extent of intra-community 
household heterogeneity (Epple and Sieg, 1999; Hardman and Ioannides, 2004; Pack and Pack 
(1977)) and lot size heterogeneity (Epple, 2006) is not supportive of the argument that zoning 
effectively screens out free riders and thus serves as a good substitute for head taxes. 
For the schooling application, the existence of private schools raises the question as to 
how the relative efficiency of centralized versus decentralized public provision is affected by 
private market alternatives.
49  Peer effects that operate within schools or neighborhoods are also 
relevant to alternative policy regimes in as much as the alternatives induce different sorting of 
households.  Extending the analysis of quantification of alternative policy regimes on welfare to 
the inclusion of peer effects is an interesting topic for more research.
50  Finally, communities 
provide multiple local public goods.  While this increases the potential gains from 
decentralization, it might heighten the residential choice externality that we find to be so 
inefficient.  A major research challenge in examining this is, of course, finding a satisfactory 
characterization of political equilibrium when multiple public goods are provided.   
  This paper does not, of course, refute Tiebout’s argument.  Rather, it tells a cautionary 
tale about applying first-best arguments in a second-best environment. 
                                                 
49 Nechyba (2003) finds that relatively wealthy households that choose private schools will live in poorer school 
districts in Tiebout equilibrium, implying more limited household sorting.  He finds as well that Tiebout equilibrium 
increases choice of private schools relative to centralized provision of public schooling.  The net effect on welfare of 
these forces is unclear and of interest to investigate. 
50 The literature on peer effects in education is surveyed in Epple and Romano (2011).   33
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Table 1: Parameter Values Baseline Model 
E[lny] Var[lny] βx  βh E[βg]S D [ βg]  ρ  γ w 






            Table 2: Welfare Effects of Tiebout Provision in Baseline Model
* 




% of Pop. Made Worse Off  63% 74% 
(-) CV  -$0.23 $810 
Change in Rents  -$50.97 $649 
(-)CV + Change in Rents  -$51.20 $1,459 
 
*Benchmark for comparison is the single jurisdiction property tax equilibrium. 
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           Table 3:  
Positive and Normative 
  Properties in Baseline 



























1 p   =   $17.13 $14.26  $13.05  $13.00  $16.64 
2 p  =    $16.19 $13.68  $13.62  $17.46 
3 p   =    $17.18 $13.61  $13.61  $17.38 
4 p  =    $18.39 $13.57  $13.61  $17.34 
5 p  =    $20.80 $13.53  $13.71  $17.29 
N1  =   100%  39%  70%  69%  70% 
N2  =     15% 12%  12%  12% 
N3  =     15% 9%  9%  9% 
N4  =     15% 6%  6%  6% 
N5  =     16% 3%  3%  3% 
t1  =   35%  34.88%      35.09% 
t2  =     35.08%      35.31% 
t3  =     35.18%      35.40% 
t4  =     35.30%      35.50% 
t5  =     35.45%      35.59% 
g1  =   $3,830  $1,881  $1,834  $1,765  $1,954 
g2  =     $3,064 $4,625  $4,283  $4,969 
g3  =     $3,850 $6,546  $6,387  $7,034 
g4  =     $5,007 $9,627  $9,299  $10,354 
g5  =     $8,017 $17,373  $15,238  $18,722 
         
Distributional and Welfare 
Properties
**       
 
         
% of Pop. Worse Off    63% 74%  73% 68% 
 (-)CV    -$0.23 $810  $788  $1,237 
Change in Rents    -$50.97 $649  $658  -$54 
(-)CV + Change in Rents    -$51.20 $1,459  $1,447  $1,183 
 
*The pi ’s are gross housing prices, the Ni’s are population proportions, the ti’s are property tax rates, and the gi’s are 
per capital public expenditures.   
**Benchmark for comparison is single jurisdiction property tax equilibrium.
 





                Table 4: Tax Payments in Property Tax Equilibria 





















  J2  $1,051 $3,064 $5,727  $2,013 
  J3  $1,331 $3,850 $7,310  $2,519 
  J4  $1,712 $5,007 $9,442  $3,295 
  J5  $2,621 $8,017 $16,126  $5,396 
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Table 5 
 




Preference  Deciles  1 2 3 4 5  6  7 8 9  10 
1  -19.92  -10.17  -6.76 -4.73 -3.30  -2.20  -1.29 0.27  2.48  7.30 
2  -19.98  -10.21  -6.79 -4.77 -3.34  -2.24  -1.32 0.27  2.50  7.35 
3  -19.99  -10.23  -6.81 -4.78 -3.35  -2.26  -1.33 0.28  2.51  7.40 
4  -19.99  -10.24  -6.82 -4.80 -3.37  -2.27  -1.34 0.29  2.52  7.40 
5  -20.03  -10.25  -6.84 -4.81 -3.38  -2.28  -1.35 0.29  2.53  7.42 
6  -20.02  -10.26  -6.85 -4.83 -3.40  -2.30  -1.36 0.29  2.54  7.46 
7  -20.04  -10.27  -6.86 -4.84 -3.41  -2.31  -1.37 0.30  2.54  7.47 
8  -20.05  -10.29  -6.88 -4.85 -3.42  -2.33  -1.38 0.30  2.56  7.47 
9  -20.07  -10.31  -6.89 -4.87 -3.44  -2.35  -1.39 0.30  2.56  7.49 
10  -20.09  -10.34  -6.93 -4.91 -3.48  -2.38  -1.41 0.31  2.59  7.56 
 




Preference  Deciles  1 2 3 4 5  6  7 8 9  10 
1  0.12 0.09 0.07 0.06 0.05  0.04  0.03 0.01  -0.001  -0.02 
2  0.08 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.02  0.004 -0.007  -0.02  -0.03  -0.03 
3  0.06  0.04  0.02 0.008  -0.002  -0.01  -0.02 -0.03  -0.03 -0.02 
4  0.05  0.02 0.007  -0.005  -0.02  -0.02  -0.03 -0.03  -0.03 -0.01 
5  0.04  0.01 -0.006  -0.02 -0.02  -0.03  -0.03 -0.03  -0.03 -0.002 
6  0.02 -0.002  -0.02 -0.03 -0.03  -0.03  -0.03 -0.03  -0.02 0.01 
7  0.01 -0.01 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03  -0.03  -0.03 -0.02  -0.02 0.02 
8  -0.002  -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03  -0.03  -0.02 -0.02  -0.004  0.04 
9  -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03  -0.02  -0.01  -0.002  0.02  0.06 




Table 6: Robustness with Respect to Parameter Values 





Vary ρ Vary  βh Vary  E[βg] Vary  SD[βg] 
  ρ = 
 
βh =  E[βg] =  SD[βg] = 
























































































































*Baseline parameter values are: ρ = –.01; βx = 1.00; βh = .356; γ = .25; w = 1.00; 
  E[βg] = .0940; SD[βg] = .000932; E 1n[y] = 10.52; Var ln [y] = .785. 
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